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The aim of this paper is to consider cognition as a special type of movement 
by emphasising the importance of reflecting upon and connecting all scales of 
movement. Rather than staying comfortably close to the visible scale of the 
body, often omitting considerations of the micro movements of cognition 
(thought, feeling, sensation) and the macro movements of the surrounding 
context (physical environment and social, cultural and historical structures), it 
is productive for researcher-practitioners to track the filigree effects of 
movement-within-movement across the boundaries within and between the 
body and the environment. In the following discussion, I will argue that 
embodied cognition operates on the smallest scale of movement within the 
body (neurological, biochemical and micro muscular) that is coupled with but 
not determined by the environment. Considered in this light the performative 
nature of our everyday actions becomes more accessible for study and 
transformation.  
 
Embodied cognition, and perception in particular, consists of movements-
within-movement that twist, contort and shift the gross and subtle connections 
and relationships previously held in place. Cognitive actions (perception as 
action) have the ability to change value and meaning, and thereby change 
decision and judgment formations that shape the boundaries of reality. 
Movement of identity boundaries does not necessitate moving the surfaces 
that are affected/effected by the newly measured relationships. Philosopher of 
cognitive science Shaun Gallagher observes the way movement shapes 
cognition noting that, in certain cases, ‘even when we are not specifically 
required to reach for it [an object] or pick it up, “canonical neurons” … 
responsible for the motoroic encoding of actions such as reaching and 
grapping are selectively activated’ (2005, p.  8). In other words, I may already 
be reaching for an object before I reach for it, I am possibly already working 
before I leave home for the studio and perhaps I am already changing as a 
result of the research I have been conducting. Some performers, using 
images, emotions and specific intentions create dispositions through micro-
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movement in the body that appear in and through all their movements. In this 
way, cognition is a special type of movement that runs through the body, 
interacts with the surroundings and feeds back into the micro movements of 
perception. 
 
 It is my assertion that combining the perceptual sensitivities of artists with the 
experimental ingenuity of scientists makes it possible to dilate awareness of 
one’s own cognitive processes and, more importantly, practice the perception 
and the configuration of one’s own sensing. For this inquiry, two tasks arise 
from attention to movement-within-movement. The first is a contextualising 
task, which suggests that current research on the ‘action in perception’ (title of 
Noe, 2004) emerges from interdisciplinary efforts across the arts and sciences 
in an attempt to address the explanatory gap between neuroscience and 
phenomenological understandings of lived experience. These attempts invoke 
a first-person perspective. The second is a coordinating task, which involves 
devising a practice that integrates movement-within-movement rather than 
isolates cognitive processes. My installation work, the READING ROOM, will 
serve as an example of creative research on perception using methods, which 
join experimental structures from cognitive science and ecological psychology 
with sensory and experiential strategies from art. This merger allows me to 
pinpoint the conditions of perception without sacrificing the information 
gleaned by first-person experience or reducing the complex conditions of 
experience. 
                                                                                                               
Contextualising action in perception  
The first task is to understand the extent to which cognition can be understood 
as action. Alva Noe observes that ‘perceiving is a way of acting’ (2004, p. 1) 
because we enact the content of our world perceptually from the bottom up 
(2004, pp. 76-90). At any given moment, there are several activities operating 
concurrently in the body. Professor of Psychology Bill Faw comments on the 
paradoxical activities that can be operating concurrently in the body. For 
example, when commands (afferent acetylcholine projections) are sent to the 
motor neurons to activate muscles to act out a dream, other commands 
(efferent acetylcholine projections) target areas to drastically lower muscle 
tone so that the muscles do not make meaningful movements (Faw 2000, p. 
65). Even at a more conscious level, we recognise that conflicting activities 
are in play when, for example, we are daydreaming while driving on the 
highway. I am always fascinated and amused that I am able to see, hear, feel 
and respond to the events within the daydream, while at the same time 
navigating the car and managing to stay on the road. Groups of neurons are 
multimodal and change over time and subsequently, the micro scales of 
action in perception, reflection and emotion impact upon movements at larger 
scales of action.  
 
The term performativity1 might be used to signal an awareness of participation 
involved in constructing a common world through selection that happens at 
the level of cognition (perception and conception). Performativity suggests a 
reflexive awareness of the possibility to re-enter the embodied operations of 
perception that augment the existing movements-within-movements and audit 
the values currently assigned to things. The performative character of re-
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evaluation or co-evaluation requires a vigilant practice. Cognitive Science has 
addressed the changing nature of the embodied inquiry by recognising that a 
strictly third-person science of observation must accommodate the 
contributions of a first-person science and reinstitute the value of reflection, 
introspection, contemplation and intuition. ‘First-person science’ is a term 
coined by focus-oriented therapist Eugene Gendlin (2000), who calls for ‘a 
science of subjective experiences interconnected to third person science by 
virtue of a new science akin to ecology, and the study of complex processes’ 
(2000, p. 109).  
 
Over the last few decades, there has been a range of theorists such as Jane 
Gallop (1990), Elizabeth Grosz (1994, 1995, 2004), Rosi Braidotti (2006), 
Maneul De Landa (2002), Dorothea Olkowski (1999), Brian Massumi (2002) 
and Erin Manning (2009) (to name only a few), whose efforts have been and 
continue to be concentrated on rethinking the relation of science and 
philosophy to account for the role of affect, perception and action within 
biological processes. Over the same period, the relationship of philosophy to 
science has been reconfigured by cognitive scientists, who have attempted, 
and continue to attempt, a naturalisation of phenomenology. This has often 
involved reconsidering the relevance of the work of Husserl (1960, 1964, 
1970, 1972) to the study of the organism-environment. A list of these sources 
may prove useful to an art and humanities audience since the titles 
themselves are instructive:  
 
• Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
science and the human experience 
• Petitot, Varela et al (1999) Naturalizing Phenomenology: issues in 
contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science 
• Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear (2000) The View from Within: 
First-person approaches to the study of consciousness 
• Alva Noe (2004) Action in Perception 
• Shaun Gallagher (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind 
• Dan Zahavi (2006). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the first 
person perspective 
• Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008) The Phenomenological Mind 
• Evan Thompson (2007) Mind in Life: Biology, phenomenology and the 
science of mind. 
 
This is by no means a comprehensive list. While these important contributions 
indicate a trend towards integrative multidisciplinary research, each is limited 
by the degree to which it considers sensory awareness as a form of 
intelligence and the extent to which it continues to isolate the body from the 
environment. Research in the sciences has not attempted to integrate top-
down conceptual processing and bottom-up perceptual learning, or to suggest 
how a person might act upon and include their research in daily life. Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch (1991) note ‘a growing concern that cognition is not the 
representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the 
enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of 
action that a being in the world performs’ (1991, p. 9). After decades of 
discourse that explicitly argues the relationship of phenomenological 
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experiencing of affect with biological processes is enactive (Varela, Thompson 
& Rosch 1991; Thompson 2007) and must correlate strands of self-
organisation and biochemistry with philosophy, psychology and neuroscience 
(Ellis, 2000, p. 3), researcher-practitioners might be ready to apply 
performativity to the environment of thoughts and the history of ideas. 
 
The movements of cognition are more difficult to perceive because they must 
not interfere with the perception of the world. The first step toward a first-
person integrative science or embodied practice is to understand how 
cognition, and perception in particular, is involved in the formation of identity 
boundaries. Philosopher of science Hideo Kawamoto (2003) notes that, in 
self-organising systems, the cooperation of two different (cognitive) actions 
such as perception and movement that do not determine one another is called 
‘coupling’ (2003, p. 89). Kawamoto develops the observation that cognitive 
activities on different dimensions establish the boundaries of body, other and 
environment:  
 
Perception involves two operations – cognition and movement – through 
which it forms a topological space of its own. With respect to cognitive 
function, sensation produces the boundary that divides the visible and the 
invisible, the audible and the inaudible, etc. … [As with the spectrum of light] 
the range of visible brightness will be reported by sensation … and we call 
such a divided space a topological space produced by sensation. At this point, 
sensation occurs as the movement that forms a boundary and subsequently 
maintains that boundary through repetition. Both cognition and movement, 
although they function separately, are indispensable to one another during the 
formation of boundary sensation. Clearly a double operation is also at work in 
this situation.  
                                                                                                        (2003, p. 88) 
 
Although Kawamoto does not give specific examples of the topological 
spaces (shapes or forms) that arise from a shift in boundary sensation, he 
does suggest that the physical substrate of neural networks and active 
sensing are inextricably linked through sensation of the environment. This 
implies that sensory boundaries can be compromised and made tentative, 
requiring a newly configured selection process to emerge in order to reinforce 
and maintain the new topology. Under these conditions the forming of forms 
has been deregulated. Perception links action at the scale of cognition with 
action at the scale of the body moving within an environment without 
necessarily moving the surfaces of the body, objects or surroundings.  
 
A quote I often cite, because it has come to operate for me as a kind of 
emblem of the intensity of interconnectedness and embodied affect,2 is from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986) book on Kafka. This quote is potent on many 
levels because it draws together layers of activity and relationship across 
scales of action, and invites an activism of the everyday to ensue. For the 
purposes of this paper, the quote serves as an embodied description of the 
turbulent and imperceptible movement that changes everything: 
  
As Kafka has the ape in ‘A Report to an Academy’ say, it isn’t a question of a 
well-formed vertical movement toward the sky or in front of one’s self, it is no 
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longer a question of breaking through the roof, but of intensely going ‘head 
over heels and away,’ no matter where, even without moving; it isn’t a 
question of liberty as against submission, but only a question of a line of 
escape or, rather, of a simple way out, ‘right, left or in any direction,’ as long 
as it has as little signifying as possible.  
(1986, p. 6, my emphasis) 
 
For now, it is necessary to overlook the implications for cognitive linguistics of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s phrase ‘as long as it has a little signifying as possible’ 
and concentrate on the moving without moving, or the imperceptible 
movement-within-movement which spins everything around in place, 
actualising possibility from the reservoir of infinite potential. When the spinning 
stops, everything seems to be as it was, except that we must re-establish the 
relationships between things again. It is as if a new space has been produced 
– some wiggle room for wriggling within a straitjacket. Momentum is produced 
from within the imperceptible space of cognition sufficient to generate escape 
velocity. Awareness of the potential of embodied cognition enables 
unanticipated distinctions to emerge within the practices of our daily life.  
 
Is it more important to understand ‘going head over heels and away even 
without moving’ as a literal process than as a metaphorical description? The 
question is: How do the events of language prompt embodied processes? For 
example, I can map Deleuze and Guattari’s description directly onto an 
experience I had exiting the New York City underground subway onto an east-
west side street. I was convinced that I was headed west. This was based on 
an assumption that my inner map corresponded to the city. The tall buildings 
and cloudy day blocked the direction of the sun as a source of information. 
Once I realised I was walking east and not west, I felt as though I had been 
turned inside out or that each part of me had somersaulted in place to be 
facing in the opposite direction. The experience highlighted for me the 
inseparability of sensing, bodily awareness and a conceptual organisation of 
the world. I propose that the micro events involved in perceiving, thinking and 
feeling are linked to very large movements in the physical environment, social 
and cultural organisation of space, the history of ideas and evolutionary 
tendencies through the embodied experience. Researcher-practitioners are in 
a position to experiment on identity boundaries and re-enter embodied 
cognition and the turbulence of movement-within-movement to open the world 
by deregulating modes of connectivity.  
 
Coordinating perceptions 
How can first-person experiments that investigate the complexity and richness 
of experience, performativity and self-awareness be devised? More than a 
century ago, William James argued that experiences were themselves 
experiencible3 and could not be quarantined when seeking to ‘objectively’ 
observe the world. I will discuss my installation work as experiments that 
attempt to act upon the implications and increased capacities that 
contemporary multidisciplinary research affords.  
 
The exhibition, READING ROOM: Experiments In Posture, Movement And 
Comprehension (April 2008 at the University of Pennsylvania and Slought 
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Foundation Gallery, Philadelphia) brought together arts practice, experimental 
psychology, cognitive science and poetics to explore the complex interactions 
of the body and the environment. Following the lead of artists-turned-
architects Arakawa and Gins,4 I was attempting to include rather than evade 
the research currently available from the life sciences by: 
 
• building research conditions/situations in which the research questions 
informed the structure of the installation (the relation of body posture 
and movement to comprehension) and were also the explicit content of 
the texts used in the experimental installation; 
• positioning the research subject (person) as the first-person researcher 
and integral part  and beneficiary of the experiment; and 
• refusing to isolate the person from his/her body by separating the texts 
(the space of thought) from the lived space of experience (feelings, 
sensation, body orientation and structures of meaning). 
 
Artists, poets, philosophers and dancers are able to offer a wealth of 
embodied knowledge and experience that would inflect the methods and 
conditions under which research on the body is conducted. The different types 
of embodied attentions and connections that artists pursue bring insight and 
practical suggestions to the way phenomena are observed, interpreted and 
analysed. The READING ROOM represented a different approach to studying 
events in complex, rather than isolated, conditions. The collaborators of the 
READING ROOM set out to devise installations that would allow persons to 
encounter the possibility of experiencing their own perception in two ways: 
conceptually, through top-down cognitive processing; and sensorially, through 
bottom-up cognitive processing. In this way the micro movements were made 
perceptible because of the posture constraints of the experiment which 
accentuated the movement required to read the texts. 
 
 As initiator of the READING ROOM exhibition, I invited poet and theorist Alan 
Prohm and philosopher of cognitive science Professor Shaun to form the 
collaborative team with me (arts practitioner and theorist). We each devised 
our own experiments with input from the others. The only requirement was 
that the texts of Arakawa and Gins would be used in the installations. In 
addition to celebrating the discursive work of Arakawa and Gins, the task of 
these experiments was to give people a first-hand experience of the 
relationship of the body to the act of reading, precisely because the space of 
text and of thinking, so often dissociated from the space of the person doing 
these things, gets produced through the bodily interaction with an 
environment. My aim, in particular, was to produce posture and movement-
specific reading situations that allowed a person to realise they were 
experiencing the sensations that the passages described, and in that way 
directly involve automatic and reflective processes. 
 
The experiments were intended to evoke reflection and to make a person 
aware of processes that link reflection to attending, sensing and perceiving. 
As an experience, reflection or self-awareness can be jarring as well as 
instructive. Producing self-awareness is not a sufficient research goal. 
Reflection must become the catalyst for action and/or change; it must become 
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a heuristic device, a mode of learning that allows self-experimentation 
regarding the body-environment relationship. Otherwise, if the reflective 
moment is not linked to a heuristic possibility and application, the experiment 
joins the ubiquitous entertainments which stimulate our senses and distract us 
but do not sustain us. It is for this reason that the READING ROOM 
collaborators emphasised first-person aspects and implemented a strategy 
coupling conscious awareness with unconscious activity. This was achieved 
by directing a person’s attention to a particular sensation in a specific posture 
or movement range while reading a text. The text also produced sensation, or 
more precisely, provided a link between the micro-movement of attention to 
the posture of the body within the architecturally shaped environment.  
 
There is not sufficient space in this paper to discuss all the works produced by 
the three collaborators, or the works I produced for the exhibition; therefore I 
will limit my descriptions and concentrate on the installation-experiment that 
proved most accessible to participants. I produced three works for three initial 
posture states: reclining, sitting and standing (see Figure 1). 
 
  
 
The standing installation-experiment scenario proved the most successful in 
producing an immediate reflective response. The motion required by the 
sitting installation proved too easy to avoid physical exertion by mentally 
adjusting the text when reading. For example, while reading the text running 
left to right, few persons adjusted their body to follow the words as they 
curved around to run upside down from right to left and performed mental 
calculations instead. The reclining work proved physically too demanding. 
While most persons laughed and had fun on the seesaw bed, almost all 
lacked the core muscle control required to stabilise the seesaw to read and 
comprehend the backwards text in the mirror provided. A few commented that 
Figure 1. Final installation views of the READING ROOM installation-
experiments in the Slought Foundation Gallery from left to right: reclining, 
sitting and standing posture scenarios. Arakawa and Gins’ texts made of 
vinyl-lettering were placed on to the surface of curved plywood and 
installed into the architecture of the gallery in forwards, backwards and 
vertical orientations requiring participants to bend, twist, balance and step 
in order to read (both look at and comprehend) the texts.  
           Photos by Jondi Keane 
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they were aware of reading the text but had no idea what it said. The standing 
installation-experiment provided just the right mix of demanding yet 
achievable physical effort. The standing work allowed persons to move in a 
way through which they were more accustomed to making adjustments and 
enabled them to more readily connect the text with their experience. 
 
The texts for each installation-experiment were carefully chosen to prompt 
reflexive movement and reflective awareness, and avoid illustrating or literally 
describing the cognitive process involved. I chose passages from Arakawa 
and Gins’ works that paralleled the participant’s situation within the installation 
and articulated connections between body, ideas and architecture. The 
participant then had to treat the text as a model of experience, a guide or a 
set of instructions. The texts were installed in a numbered sequence, which 
led the reader through a series of movements. The following four sentences 
are the ones selected for the standing installation were taken from a single 
passage in Madeline Gins’ book Helen Keller or Arakawa (1994). I have 
inserted bracketed comments to indicate the direction and orientation of the 
installed texts and the movements that participants would have to make. 
Correlate the text with images of the installation in Figure 2 (below). 
 
1. A thin-thick sheet of specific distance, that distance which is a texture that 
lies between the bed and the ceiling. ‘Pick it up by what corner,’ she wondered. 
[Text runs HORIZONTALLY UPWARDS – participant must lean body to the left] 
2. Upon the paper thickened with distance can be read ‘I See the Ceiling from 
My Bed’. A line is drawn right across this sentence. The line seems to be 
holding the words back up on the ceiling. [HORIZONTALLY DOWNWARDS – 
participant leans to the right] 
3. But the ceiling, the distance from the ceiling, the words and the line straight 
across these have all now been brought to the vertical. [VERTICALLY FROM 
BOTTOM UP – participant must read each word from the top down and jump 
up to the next word] 
4. The viewer stands facing a vertical slice of the view she’d normally see from 
a horizontal position; she’s come to be in two positions at once. [VERTICALLY 
FROM TOP DOWN – participant reads a large and a small version of this 
sentence, which lead back to the floor causing the participant to back up on the 
gravel]  
 (Gins, 1994, p. 225) 
 
As the expression on philosopher Gordon Bearn’s face testifies, the two 
worlds previously held apart: the private world of comprehension, 
contemplation and bodily awareness and the public world of architectural 
space, objects and human movements are drawn into proximity and rub up 
against each other. In this instance, Gordon has interpreted the collision of 
and commingling of perceptual and conceptual processing as a pleasurable 
experience (see Figure 2).  
 
These experiments are works in progress. Structures which study the complex 
conditions of cognitive processes can benefit from the sensibilities and 
embodied awareness cultivated in the performing and visual arts. In order to 
focus on the heuristic aspect of installation-experiments, the context under 
which the actions are performed must be coordinated with rich sensory 
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conditions and the opportunity for redoubled or reflexive/reflective awareness 
of movement-within-movement and the conditions in which perceiving 
happens. In the case of the READING ROOM, the installations are a mixture 
of objects and environmental (architectural) features, and differ from 
meditative and bodily exercises that focus on the workings of the body or task-
oriented exercise that provide a pre-established relationship to a specific 
object or tool. What is unique about the READING ROOM, and potentially 
beneficial to the design of future research, is the use of movement that 
crosses the scales of cognition, bodily movement and environment. By 
devising situations in which the participant becomes a researcher of his/her 
own modes of perception and inherent performativity following the 
movements-within-movements to their emergent outcomes, it becomes 
possible to observe, guide and direct the connections between embodied 
cognition and participatory arrangement of meaningful features of the world. 
 
 
 
          
 
Figure 2. Drawing of standing installation-experiment 
with orientation of text indicated and photos of the 
responses a participant made to the experience of 
moving and repositioning himself while reading.   
Drawing and photos by Jondi Keane. 
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Summary and conclusion 
The reflective artist is alert to the filigree connections of movements, which 
run across scales of action connecting the micro movements of thought to the 
macro movements of the physical and social world. I have argued that 
embodied cognition, which attends to the distribution of awareness throughout 
the body, is a special kind of movement or movement-within-movement that 
extends into the environment (physical and historical context) and requires 
further study. The arts can contribute to this research by bringing knowledge 
of bodily intelligence and felt experience to bear upon research questions and 
methods in the life sciences. The reflective abilities cultivated by artists can 
offer new perspectives and procedures to attempts to naturalise 
phenomenology and forge a first-person science. 
 
The context for turning reflective movement into heuristic tools can be seen in 
the current trends in cognitive science, experimental and developmental 
psychology, philosophy and the arts. Noe (2004) and Faw (2000) remind us 
that there are several concurrent cognitive activities that operate in different 
dimensions. Kawamoto (2003) instructs us that cognition is already a 
movement between cognitive activities and this movement produces the 
parameters of sensation and the boundaries of identity. Deleuze and Guattari 
point to the possibilities for self-experimentation through affect. When applied 
to first-person science these methods provide a more inclusive form of 
experimentation and research. The response to the READING ROOM 
installation-experiments suggests that by activating perception of movement-
within-movement and by tying it to a form of action, a productive performativity 
ensues and acts as a constant impetus for learning and further action.  
 
Artists thrive on changing conditions and on the production of increased 
possibilities each time the field of knowing is re-entered. Although all 
researchers will continue to look for the chain of causal events, I propose that 
non-causal or indirect connections are produced by concurrent and coupling 
activities. The reflective artist who is constantly performing re-evaluated 
relationships is also able to attend to and experiment with subtle movements-
within-movements. Arakawa and Gins describe this cumulative ‘indirectness’, 
which occurs within a single person and across a community. In ‘Vital 
Contextualising Information’, they assert that: 
 
Indirectness dilates time so that no matter how much time has elapsed one 
finds that it has in the end been just the amount of time that was necessary 
for a cumulative effort – be it that of one performer or many – to have taken 
care of the problem … The more coordinating skills that are mastered, the 
more complexly can indirect means be put to a direct purpose – the parlaying 
of indirectness.  
         (Arakawa & Gins, 2003, pp. 20-21) 
 
The complexity of concurrence, whether it is called movement-within-
movement, embodied cognition or parlaying indirectness, can be coupled with 
the rigorous examination of causes and effects as long as we do not limit our 
inquiry to a single scale of action. First-person science or the practice of 
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embodied cognition proposes to integrate reflection and observation to 
optimise the performative process of making. 
 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
1 From Austin’s ‘performative utterance’ (1976) to Butler’s discursive performance of gendered 
identity (1990,1997) to Bolt’s suggestion (2004) that images do not solely represent but 
perform our relationship with the world, the terms ‘performance’ and ‘performativity’ signal an 
implicit and reflective awareness that accompanies action. 
2 Keane, Jondi, ‘Hyperconnectivity through Deleuze: Indices of affect’. In D. Smith, E. Holland 
& C. Stivale (Eds.) (2009), Deleuze: Image and Text (London: Continuum), and – ‘A 
Bioscleave report: Constructing the perceiver’. In F. Kral and J-J. Lecercle (Eds.), Arakawa 
and Gins: Philosophy and architecture (Paris: Rodopi Press forthcoming). 
3 William James’ notion of radical empiricism is discussed by Harry Heft as part of the lineage 
of ecological psychology (James 1912/1976, p. 14 in Heft 2001, p. 30). 
4 The READING ROOM project was an exhibition produced specifically for the Second 
International Arakawa and Gins: Architecture and Philosophy Conference held at University of 
Pennsylvania and the Slought Foundation in Philadelphia, PA in April 2008. 
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